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THE USE OF FORCE IN MAKING AN ARREST
The question of how much force should be used in making
an arrest has become a more and more complicated problem for
the courts. The old rule that. an officer may use all the force
necessary in making the arrest of a misdemeanant, and may use
the required force even to the taking of a life, in case of a
felony, is now very difficult to apply. Legislation has made
many minor crimes felonies, until the line of demarcation between felonies and misdemeanors has become so fine that it is
often hard to tell them apart. Under this condition, it is unreasonable to say that for a minor offense, because it is listed in
the statutes as a felony, the officer in effecting the arrest of the
offender should be justified in killing, even if it should be necessary. It is not surprising that the courts have said as in
Renean vs. State,' "It is better to allow one guilty of a misdemeanor to escape altogether than to take his life. And, we
may add that it may be a question worthy of consideration whether the law ought not to be modified in respect to the lower grade
of felonies, especially in view of the large number of crimes of
this character created by comparatively recent legislation, whether as to these even an escape would be better than to take life."
Such opinions as these lead us to believe that the courts will take
the matter into strict consideration and force arresting officers
to be very careful and very sure of themselves before going too
far h making an arrest. This point is also strongly brought
out by Somerville, J. in Story vs. State2 , "The stealing of a hog, a
sheep, or a goat is, under our statute, a felony without regard
to the pecuniary value of the animal. So would be the larceny
of a single ear of corn, which is part of an outstanding crop.
It would be shocking to the good order of government to have it
proclaimed with the sanction of the courts, that one may in
broad daylight, commit a wilful homicide in order to prevent the
larceny of an ear of corn." In many cases this same idea may
be found, but others fail to realize the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has practically vanished, at least as
far as arrest is concerned.
'2 Lea (Tenn.) 720, 31 Am. Rep. 626 (1879).
271 Ala. 329 (1882).
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In an attempt to curtail officers from using too much force
in making an arrest, it is not with the idea to leave our laws unprotected and unenforced. Too many persons fear for the
sanctity of our law enforcement. For their benefit it might be
well to cite England, where it is not the practice to load officers of the law down with a small arsenal as our country tries
to do; and, for the benefit of those who fear our officers will
be without protection against gangsters with sub-machine guns,
that the courts always uphold officers when they are resisted
with force which puts them in danger of life and limb. 3 As in
Bowman vs. Commonwealt74 it is said, "Protection must be
afforded to our ministerial officers; while the life of one charged
with a minor offense ought never to be taken, although resisting an arrest, unless absolutely necessary, still the order of the
court must be executed, and when the officer is resisted with
such force as the use of a deadly weapon, or the attempt to use
it in order to prevent the execution of the writ, he can meet it
with like force ... He is not compelled to retreat, but can use
such force as will enable him to take the body of the person
charged and to overcome the resistance offered." Even in this
case which is in support of the officer, the court says he is not
in any event to use such force unless there is absolute necessity for it.
The officers of our land as well as the citizens must try to
act reasonably. It should always be remembered that there
are numbers of persons arrested every day who are perfectly
innocent of the charge brought against them. For their protection alone, a strict rule on officers is justified. Officers must
be sure of their man and not strike him down on slight or ill
grounded suspicion. The taking of the life of an innocent
party is difficult to justify in any case. 5 As stated by the court
in Reed vs. Commzonwealth, 6 "So high does the law regard the
taking of human life that if a felon can be taken without the
'State vs. Dierberger, 96 Mo. 666, 10 S. W. 168 (1888); Dilger vs.
Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651 (1889); Stevens vs. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 32, 47 S. W. 229 (1906); State vs. McNinch, 90
N. C. 695 (1884); Donehy vs. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 474, 186 S. W.
161 (1916); State vs. Sigman, 106 N. C. 728, 11 S. E. 520 (1890); Reed
vs. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 126, 100 S. W. 856 (1907); Fitzpatrick vs.
Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 385, 275 S. W. 819 (1925).
'96 Ky. 8, 27 S. W. 870 (1894).
r State vs. Boggs, 87 W. Va. 738, 106 S. E. 47 (1921).
6Supra, note 3.
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taking of a life, yet is slain, the killing will be murder.... The
killing can only be done of necessity, the existence of which
the jury is to determine." The jury in this case is given the
chance to justify the force used by the officer, but in other cases
it has been stated as in State vs. Dunning,7 "It is a general
principle very generally accepted that an officer having the right
to arrest an offender may use such force as is necessary to effect
his purpose, and to the great extent he is made the judge of the
degree of force that may be properly extended." This rule must
be followed by the statement of the Kentucky Court in Reed vs.
Commonwealth, supra, to get the proper result from our officers; they must realize that their acts will be judged by a
strict rule of the necessary force that may be used.
Our laws today are so complex and difficult that as stated
before there exists little ground for the distinction between
misdemeanors and felonies. Yet it will be found in almost every
case stating the general rule that life should not be taken in
event of a misdemeanor, but the taking of a felon's life is excused if he cannot be captured otherwise. Now we do not mean
to say that in some felonies, officers are not justified in shooting
to prevent the felon's escape, but these cases axe rare and this
should be remembered by the courts in justifying such force.
As the court said in State vs. Bryant,8 "The importance of
having felons arrested in cases of capital felonies-such as
murder and rape-must be much greater than in cases of inferior felonies, such as larceny.... But ordinarily there is not
the same urgency in case of flight; for, although he be not arrested then and there, yet he may be arrested at another time
and place. So it would seem, that at any rate there ought to be
pursuit, or a certainty of escape, before killing could be justified-else how does it appear that he could not otherwise be
arrested ?" This was a case of an arrest by a private person,
but the same should apply to officers. Some cases have realized
this and applied a strict rule as to how much force the officer
may use in making an arrest. 9 Many cases could be cited to
give the reasons why the vague line between felonies and mis1177 N. C. 559, 98 S. E. 530 (1919).
s65 N. C. 327 (1871).
9Birt vs. State, 156 Ala. 29, 46 So. 858 (1908); Johnson vs. Cunningham, 107 Miss. 140, 65 So. 115 (1914); Stevens vs. Commonwealth,
supra, note 3.

USE OF FORCE IN MAKNUG ARREST
demeanors no longer has reason to exist, but that has been
shown sufficiently to bring out the point.
The court- have forced officers to be sure of the offender's
offense before using great force in making an arrest. In Petrie
vs. Coianzonwealth,'0 the court said, "But where no felony has
been committed the reason for the rule does not apply, and it
seems to us that the sacredness of human life and the danger
of abuse does not permit an extension of the common-law rule
to cases of suspected felonies. To do so would bring many cases
of misdemeanors within the rule, for in a large number of cases
the officer could show that he had reason to suspect the commission of a felony, and it would be left with him to say
whether he proceeded against the defendant for a misdemeanor
or a felony."
Since the distinction is made by most courts between the
force that may be used in making arrest in cases of felonies
and misdemeanors, especially in Kentucky, it is well to notice
how the courts in these cases have stood. The older cases made
the distinction under the common law and that is largely the
reason for the great distinction between misdemeanors and felonies. First taking the rule as to misdemeanors we find Reed
vs. Connovivwealth" states the rule clearly, "In arresting one
guilty of a misdemeanor the officer is never justified in killing
to effect the arrest, and this is true whether the offender is fleeing to avoid arrest or to escape from custody. If the officer
meet with resistance he may oppose sufficient force to overcome
it, even to the taking of a life, providing the offender is resisting to such an extent as to place the officer in danger of loss of
life or great bodily harm." These cases are very clear in their
statement of how valuable the life of a misdemeanant is, but in
another paragraph they state that if a felon is being arrested the
12
force used by the officer is to be regarded with more lenience.
This rule stated in the above case is the proper rule and should be
well regarded, for no person committing a misdemeanor should
10114 Ky. 103, 70 S. W. 297 (1902).
S upra, note 3.
'Stevens

vs. Commonwealth, supra, note 3; Smith vs. State, 59

Ark. 132, 26 S. W. 712 (1894); State vs. Dunning, supra, note 7;
Thomas vs. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 18 S. W. 854 (1892); Dilger vs.
Commonwealth, szepra, note 3; Donehy vs. Commonwealth, supra, note
3; Tuck vs. Beliles, 153 Ky. 848, 156 S. W. 883 (1913); Bowman vs.
Commonwealth, su'pra, note 4.
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be shot down by an over-zealous officer doing his duty with a
firm hand. The law, however, is so cluttered with minor offenses as felonies that to sanction in any way much force by
an arresting officer is indeed shocking to the good order of government. Resisting persons, if they put the officer in danger
of life or limb may be shot if, and only if, however, it is absolutely necessary. We find that this rule works very well, and
it can be applied to all cases, with the exception of the more
heinous crimes, even if some would be felonies. After all a
life is a life, and, when in any case but the capital offenses, the
offender may later be captured and turned over for trial, it is
a hard rule that would sanction his killing merely for his arrest
then and there.
The rule as tQ felonies is laid down in 1 Archbold's Pr. and
P1. 29: "When a party may be lawfully arrested for a felony
and he knowing the cause flees so that he can not be taken otherwise than by killing him, the constable pursuing him will be
justified in killing him; or a private person will, in like manner
be justfied, if he can prove the deceased was actually guilty of a
felony.',' 3 This old rule is based on the old common law distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. At that time a
felony was a heinous crime and most of them were punishable
by death, and a person committing that sort of a crime should
not, perhaps, be allowed to escape. Today, however, as compared with several hundred capital crimes in England under the
early common law, we have very few. Is is not an old saying in
the law that the reason for the rule existing having passed,
the rule itself should go ? Life is rather a precious thing and
and can not be replaced, but a mountaineer charged with making
corn liquor if he tried to escape was to be shot because that
crime was listed in the statutes as a felony. Cases have been
cited that realize this, and is it not time that all the courts
begin to understand the sanctity of life means more than the
sanctity of an overzealous law officer? The same rule applies
to the arresting officer in case of felonies if he is resisted. He
will always be protected if the felon resists arrest with such
1'Commonwealth vs. Lang, 17 Pa. Super. 641 (1901); U. S. vs.
Clark, 31 Fed. 710 (1887); Carr vs. State, 43 Ark. 99 (1884); Dilger
vs. Commonwealth, supra, note 3; State vs. Dunning, supra, note 7;
State vs. Sigman, supra, note 3.
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force as to endanger the officer's life or limb, even if he has
to take the offender's life, no other method working. 14
Such a course as above suggested of not making a distinction as to the force that may be used in making an arrest between
felonies and misdemeanors, with the exception of the more heinous and capital crimes, may be followed by the courts without
hampering justice. There are several factors that should be considered in determining the force that should be used: (1) Can
the offender be recaptured? (2) Is the offender known to be
guilty? (3) How serious a crime has been committed? (4) Is
the officer's life in danger? Here the problem of self-defense,
which is not primarily involved in a consideration of the use of
force in making an arrest, must be also considered. The two
problems involve somewhat different factors. 15
Too much force is dangerous in any cause, and arrest is
no exception. The courts must see that officers do not overstep
their authority and use too much force in effecting an arrest.
This will not hamper justice, but it will protect persons arrested
for minor offenses. Since, under our statutes, there are so
many of these minor offenses, the courts should never sanction
much force by an arresting officer unless it is shown to be
absolutely necessary.
AND Ew CLARN.

Supra, note 13.
""The doctrine of self-defense has no application in such cases,
because it is the duty of the officer to effect the arrest or imprisonment of the offender, without the use of unnecessary or improper violence, Dougherty's Case, 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393; William's Case, 44
Ala. 41. This duty could not be performed if any element of selfdefense was essential to the protection of the officer. He must, to do
his duty, become the aggressor, and in no event is he required to retreat before an assailing prisoner." Birt vs. State, 156 Ala. 29, 46 So.
858 (1908).

